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Abstract:  
 
This paper proposes a methodology for testing for whether tax reforms are pro-poor. 
This is done by extending stochastic dominance techniques to help identify tax reforms 
that will necessarily be deemed absolutely or relatively pro-poor by a wide spectrum of 
poverty analysts. The statistical properties of the various estimators are also derived in 
order to make the method implementable using survey data. The methodology is used to 
assess the pro-poorness of possible reforms to Mexico’s indirect tax system. This leads 
to the identification of several possible pro-poor tax reforms in that country. It also shows 
how the pro-poorness of a tax reform depends on one’s conception of poverty as well as 
on the revenue and efficiency impact of the reform. 
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1 Introduction
Recent policy objectives have often focused on improvements in the well-
being of the less fortunate in society. There are several reasons for this: some
are related to a rise in the ethical and policy importance of poverty reduction
(best exemplified by the salience of the United Nations’ Millenium Development
Goals), while others are linked to more specific conditions, such as concerns for
the effect on the poor of food price variability and of the recent global financial
and economic crisis.
Signs of such policy interest abound, regarding particularly the use of indirect
taxation and subsidies as tools for poverty alleviation. For instance, a report from
an initiative recently launched by the UNDP, the Government of China and DFID
states that “the depth and coverage of China’s fiscal reform process has been un-
even, and there is scope for strengthening the links between fiscal reforms and
poverty reduction goals.”1 Commentators in the Philippines have argued that the
“fiscal crisis hurts the poor Filipinos more than it hurts the rich and the big cor-
porations. [...] Only under a pro-poor management of the fiscal crisis will make
Filipinos rally behind the Arroyo administration during this difficult time.”2 One
element of the reaction of the Filipino government has indeed been to expand the
use of the Value Added Tax (VAT) because it claims that “its burden falls heavier
on those who consume more ’VATable’ goods and services.”3
In India, the press has “wanted Finance minister P. Chidambaram to balance
tight fiscal policy with pro-poor policies”.4 The recent 2008 Pakistan budget has
also been criticized because it “was hoped that the current government would
realise that achieving fiscal discipline and increasing revenues is important, but
not on the backs of the poor. If the government wants to address the challenges
of inflation, rising inequality and poverty, it must devise a progressive taxation
policy that relies less on indirect taxes and more on increasing the tax-GDP ratio
by extending the tax net to untaxed sectors.”5 Concerns for the poverty effect of
government financing procedures have also extended to other areas, such as how
health care financing systems can be designed and implemented to be ’pro-poor’
(see for instance Bennett and Gilson 2001). This naturally suggests the broader
1http://www.undp.org.cn/projects/39815.pdf.
2 http://aupwu.blogspot.com/2004/11/pro-poor-response-to-fiscal-crisis.html.
3http://www.sunstar.com.ph/static/dav/2006/02/13/bus/expanded.vat.is.pro.poor.solon.html.
4http://www.financialexpress.com/news/fm-should-balance-policy-with-propoor-plans-
fitch/127916/.
5 http://www.opfblog.com/2901/is-pakistan-budget-2008-pro-poor-by-sadia-m-malik/.
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policy problem of using a tax and expenditure system to minimize poverty subject
to some government budget constraint. As is well-known, an overriding tradeoff
in such problems is to balance potential gains in equity and in efficiency.
The last decade has also seen several conceptual and empirical contributions
on whether growth is “pro-poor”. A central issue is whether the poor’s benefits
from growth exceed some norm — see, among many recent interesting contribu-
tions to that issue, Bruno, Ravallion, and Squire (1998), United Nations (2000),
Eastwood and Lipton (2001), Ravallion (2001), Dollar and Kraay (2002), World
Bank (2002) and Bourguignon (2003). This norm may be absolute or relative
to the changes in the entire distribution of income, as discussed for example in
Duclos (2009).
A similar issue applies to the effect of public policy in general. As is clear
from the above, we may wish for instance to assess whether a fiscal reform is
“pro-poor”, in the sense that the benefits that the poor derive from it exceed some
norm. Unfortunately, as with many other distributive assessments, the precise
definition that can be given to the pro-poorness of a tax reform is essentially a
matter of normative judgement and can be open to the criticism of being arbitrary
to at least some extent. Elements of arbitrariness arise inter alia in the choice
of a poverty line to separate the poor from the non-poor and in the choice of an
aggregative procedure to summarize the reform’s impact on the poor.6 To show
how one can reduce these sources of arbitrariness in understanding pro-poorness
is the first main objective of this paper.
The second main objective of the paper is to assess how and whether a (margi-
nal) tax reform can be considered to be pro-poor. Santoro (2007) categorizes
the economic literature on the impact of marginal tax reforms into three different
approaches. The first is based on Ahmad and Stern (1984) and uses a specific
social welfare function. The second identifies directions for marginal tax reforms
based on classes of social welfare functions that display an aversion to inequal-
ity and that are symmetric — this was introduced by Yitzhaki and Thirsk (1990),
Yitzhaki and Slemrod (1991) and Mayshar and Yitzhaki (1996). The third ap-
proach supposes that marginal tax reforms can also be used as instruments for
changing poverty and is based inter alia on Makdissi and Wodon (2002), Duclos,
Makdissi, and Wodon (2008) and Liberati (2003).
This paper extends this third approach by testing for whether indirect tax re-
6Different approaches have been proposed to separate the poor from the non-poor and to com-
pute indices of “growth pro-poorness”. See, for instance, McCulloch and Baulch (1999), Ravallion
and Datt (2002), Kakwani, Khandker, and Son (2003), Ravallion and Chen (2003), Klasen (2004),
Son (2004), Essama-Nssah (2005), and Araar, Duclos, Audet, and Makdissi (2007).
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forms can be considered to be pro-poor. By this, it is meant that an indirect tax
reform must be deemed to be “equitable towards the poor” or “in favor of the
poor”, in the sense that the benefits of the reform must accrue (in some sense to be
made precise later) “more” to the poor, or that its costs must hurt “less” the poor.
The first and second main objectives are dealt with in Section 2. The results
are general enough to cover the cases of negative (subsidies) and positive indirect
taxation, and of tax reforms that may or may not be revenue and/or efficiency
neutral. Although for expositional simplicity the paper focusses on indirect tax
changes, the methodology can be relatively easily adapted to deal with the effect
of changes in direct taxation and in-kind benefits. Section 2 further hints to how
the paper’s framework and analytical results can also be used to assess the impact
of tax reforms on absolute and relative inequality.
The analytical results of Section 2 show that whether tax reforms involving
only one good are pro-poor depend roughly on whether the good is an inferior,
a necessary, or a luxury one. More generally, the pro-poorness of a tax reform
depends on a mixture of income (for redistribution) and price (for efficiency) elas-
ticities that are easily combined to check for necessary and sufficient conditions
for whether the tax reform can be considered to be unambiguously pro-poor. Al-
though simple to test for, the pro-poorness of a tax reform can nevertheless differ
quite significantly from the optimal taxation literature’s results on whether a tax
reform improves social welfare.
For instance, an efficiency-neutral and revenue-neutral tax reform that in-
creases the price of good j but decreases the price of good i is absolutely and
relatively pro-poor if the poor’s (weighted) share of the total consumption of good
i exceeds their (weighted) share of the total consumption of good j, the shares
being given by the poor’s poverty gaps. If, however, real income falls after the
tax reform (because of a rise in the total deadweight loss), relative pro-poorness
demands that the share of the poor in total real income does not fall after the re-
form, but absolute pro-poorness demands that the absolute real income of the poor
does not fall after the reform by more than the absolute fall in total real income.
An economically inefficient reform will therefore be more likely to be absolutely
pro-poor than relatively pro-poor.
The more inefficient it is to tax a good, the greater the tax rate that must be
levied on that good to generate the tax revenues needed to decrease taxes on an-
other, less price-elastic, good. If the more price-elastic good is not a luxury good,
this makes increasing its price less likely to be relatively pro-poor. Only when the
price-elastic good is also a luxury good will an increase in its tax be conducive
to greater relative pro-poorness. An efficiency-decreasing tax reform will also be
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more likely to be considered relatively pro-poor than absolutely pro-poor as the
importance given to the poorest of the poor increases.
Section 3 then proceeds by proposing estimators and deriving sampling dis-
tributions for the tools needed to test for tax pro-poorness. This is needed to
implement the analytical methods using survey data. For the important case of
first-order pro-poorness, these estimators involve non-parametric regressions, for
which the sampling distributions that need to be derived are more involved. The
estimators and their sampling distributions cover all of the possible analytical
cases derived in Section 2.
Section 4 applies the methodology to Mexico’s indirect tax system using Mex-
ico’s 2004 ENIGH database. We find for instance that a marginal tax reduction on
Food or on Energy would be relatively pro-poor, and that this conclusion would be
valid for a very large class of relative pro-poor judgements. But, according to the
paper’s definition of absolute pro-poorness, a marginal reduction in taxes on any
of the different goods considered would need to be thought of as being absolutely
anti-poor. A revenue- and efficiency-neutral tax reform that decreases Food taxes
and increases Transportation taxes would be considered absolutely and relatively
pro-poor for all indices and lines within a wide class and range. The application
also shows that applying statistical inference techniques can alter conclusions in
a way that sometimes contrasts importantly with the analysis made solely on the
basis of sample estimates.
Section 5 concludes by summarizing briefly the main results. Most of the
proofs of the main results can be found in the Appendix of Section 6.
2 Notation and methodological framework
2.1 Poverty Measurement
We first start with the presentation of rather general views of how poverty and
tax pro-poorness can be assessed. For simplicity, suppose that poverty indices are
additive7 and therefore take the form of
P (z) =
∫ ω
0
p (y, z) dF (y) , (1)
7The Foster, Greer, and Thorbecke (1984) indices are an example of popular additive poverty
measures. Other examples of additive indices can be found in Watts (1968), Clark, Hemming, and
Ulph (1981) and Chakravarty (1983).
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where y is real income, z is the poverty line (in real terms), F (·) is the cumulative
distribution function of income with support over [0, ω], and p (y, z) is a function
that measures the poverty of an individual with an income y and using a poverty
line z. We suppose that p (y, z) ≥ 0 and that p (y, z) = 0 for all y > z. Duclos and
Makdissi (2004) use the properties of P (z) to define classes of poverty indices
Πs(z) for some order s. These classes are defined by:
Πs(z) =
P (z)
∣∣∣∣∣∣
p(y, z) ∈ Ĉs(z),
(−1)i p(i) (y, z) ≥ 0 for i = 0, 1, 2, ..., s,
p(t) (z, z) = 0 for t = 0, 1, 2, ..., s,
 (2)
where p(i) (y, z) represents the i-th derivative of p (y, z) with respect to y and Ĉs
is the set of continuous functions that are s-times differentiable on [0, ω].
For poverty indices P ∈ Π1(z), an increase in the income of any one individ-
ual will weakly reduce the poverty index. This class of indices is thus Paretian.
The indices are also symmetrical since exchanging incomes between two individ-
uals will not affect poverty (by the property of the anonymous distribution func-
tion in (1)). This type of indices can thus be said to satisfy Pen (1971)’s principles
for comparing distributions (see Duclos, Makdissi, and Wodon (2008)).
The poverty indices included in Π2(z) are also convex. This implies that they
respect the Pigou-Dalton principle of transfer, a principle that states that a transfer
from any one individual to a poorer individual should weakly decrease poverty. In
addition to obeying the above principles, the poverty indices that belong to Π3(z)
must also obey the Kolm (1976) principle of transfers, which states that a Pigou-
Dalton transfer that takes place at the bottom of the distribution should have a
greater impact on poverty than one taking place higher up in the distribution.
Hence, a progressive transfer that occurs within a lower part of the distribution
will reduce poverty even if it is accompanied by a symmetric regressive transfer
higher up in the distribution. Indices of a class Πs(z) with s greater then 3 can be
interpreted by using the generalized transfer principle proposed by Fishburn and
Willig (1984). This generalized principle states that the greater the order s, the
greater is the sensibility of an index to changes occurring in a lower part of the
distribution.
2.2 Impact of price changes
Let us now suppose that we wish to test whether an indirect tax reform can be
considered to be pro-poor. We consider three possible scenarios through which
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this can be done.
1. The government wishes to implement a marginal reduction in the tax (or
a marginal increase in the subsidy) on good i, without attempting to offset
the fall in total government revenue (possibly because the government is
running a budget surplus).
2. The government wishes to implement a marginal increase in the tax (or a
marginal decrease in the subsidy) on good i, without attempting to offset
the increase in total government revenue (possibly because the government
is running a budget deficit).
3. The government wishes to implement a revenue-neutral indirect tax reform.
It must therefore finance a marginal tax reduction on good i (or a marginal
increase in its subsidy) with a marginal increase in the tax (or a marginal
decrease in the subsidy) on good j 6= i.
Now assume that producer prices are held constant and, for expositional sim-
plicity, set them to 1 so that q = e+t, where q is the vector of current consumption
prices, e is a vector of ones, and t is the vector of indirect taxes. The impact of
a marginal change dti to the tax on a good i will impact the poverty level of an
individual with income y by
∂p (y, z)
∂ti
= p(1) (y, z)
∂y
∂ti
. (3)
Using Roy’s identity and setting the vector of reference prices to the current price
vector, the change in real income produced by a marginal change in the tax on
good i is given by (see for instance Besley and Kanbur 1988)
∂y
∂ti
= −xi (y, q) , (4)
where xi (y, q) is the Marshallian demand of good i at the vector of current prices,
q. Introducing (4) into (3), we have that
∂p (y, z)
∂ti
= −p(1) (y, z) xi (y, q) . (5)
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2.3 Pro-poorness
We do not wish, however, to determine if a tax reform reduces or increases
poverty, but rather if it can be considered pro-poor. This requires distinguishing
between relative and absolute pro-poorness. We will say that a tax reform is R-
pro-poor for relative pro-poorness and A-pro-poor for absolute pro-poorness. In
the growth terminology of Duclos (2009) and Araar, Duclos, Audet, and Makdissi
(2007), relative pro-poorness is checked by comparing P (z) using F1((1 + g)y)
for a posterior distribution F1(y) to P (z) using an initial distribution F0(y), using
a relative “norm” g (to be discussed later). Absolute pro-poorness with an absolute
norm a (also discussed below) is checked by comparing P (z) using F1(y+a) for a
posterior distribution F1(y) to P (z) using an initial distribution F0(y). Formally:
Definition 1 A movement from an initial distribution F0 to a posterior distribu-
tion F1 is judged relatively pro-poor by an index P (z) if and only if∫ ∞
0
p (y, z) dF1 ((1 + g)y)−
∫ ∞
0
p (y, z) dF0 (y) < 0. (6)
Definition 2 A movement from an initial distribution F0 to a posterior distribu-
tion F1 is judged absolutely pro-poor by an index P (z) if and only if∫ ∞
0
p (y, z) dF1 (y + a)−
∫ ∞
0
p (y, z) dF0 (y) < 0. (7)
For expositional simplicity, we will assume for the purposes of this paper that
the relative norm g is set to the growth rate of average real income. This is consis-
tent with the view of Kakwani and Pernia (2000) (p.3) that “promoting pro-poor
growth requires a strategy that is deliberately biased in favor of the poor so that
the poor benefit proportionately more than the rich.” It is also consistent with the
view that relative pro-poorness is tightly linked to inclusiveness and participation
of the poor in growth processes and (more generally) in distributional changes.
Setting g to the growth rate of average real income also allows linking relative
pro-poorness to relative inequality reduction, as we will discuss more explicitly
later.
Again for expositional simplicity, the absolute norm a is set in this paper to
the numerical (as distinct from the proportional) change in average real income.
Loosely speaking, this implicitly supposes that we wish distances between in-
comes and the mean not to be increased by distributional changes. This also
implicitly links absolute pro-poorness to absolute inequality reduction. Along
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that view, a tax reform that decreases mean income because it increases govern-
ment revenue could still be considered absolutely pro-poor, possibly because the
increase in government revenue would allocate to everyone an increase in the ab-
solute value of public goods equal to the increase in average government revenue.
Generalizations of this to other settings would not be difficult, by setting for in-
stance g to growth in some quantiles (such as the median), or by setting a to 0
(which would be equivalent to arguing that a change is pro-poor if it increases the
poor’s absolute living standards — e.g., Ravallion and Chen 2003).
2.4 The impact of single price changes
Let then:
y∗R =
y
1 + g
, (8)
y∗A = y − a, (9)
∂p∗η (y, z)
∂ti
= p(1) (y, z)
∂y∗η
∂ti
, η ∈ {A,R}. (10)
We now wish to determine how y∗R and y∗A vary with a marginal variation in
ti. The average impact of dti on real income in the total population is given by dti
times the average consumption of good i, which is denoted as Xi (q):
Xi (q) =
∫ ∞
0
xi (y, q) dF (y) . (11)
Using this, the proportional change in average real income (following a change
dti in a tax rate ti) is given by
−Xi (q)
µ
dti, (12)
where µ =
∫
ydF (y) is average income. The absolute change in average real
income is given by
−Xi (q) dti. (13)
In order to determine the impact of a marginal variation in ti on y∗R and y∗A,
we must subtract from the gross impact on real income given by (4) the impact on
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real income of the change in the pro-poor norm given by (8) and (9). This leads to
∂y∗R
∂ti
= −xi (y, q) + yXi(q)
µ
(14)
and
∂y∗A
∂ti
= −xi (y, q) +Xi(q). (15)
Using (14) and (15), we obtain
∂p∗R (y, z)
∂ti
= −p(1) (y, z)
[
xi (y, q)− yXi(q)
µ
]
(16)
and
∂p∗A (y, z)
∂ti
= −p(1) (y, z) [xi (y, q)−Xi(q)] . (17)
To obtain the impact on total poverty, we integrate (16) and (17) over the entire
income distribution. The result is
∂P ∗R (z)
∂ti
= −
∫ ∞
0
p(1) (y, z)
[
xi (y, q)− yXi(q)
µ
]
dF (y) (18)
and
∂P ∗A (z)
∂ti
= −
∫ ∞
0
p(1) (y, z) [xi (y, q)−Xi(q)] dF (y) . (19)
2.5 Testing for pro-poorness of single price changes
We can now introduce pro-poor consumption dominance curves (CDη:s), η ∈
{A,R} and s ∈ {1, 2, 3...}.8 Those pro-poor consumption dominance curves are
defined as:
CDR:si (z) =

[
xi(z,q)
Xi(q)
− z
µ
]
f (y) for s = 1
z∫
0
CDR:s−1i (y) dy for s ≥ 2,
(20)
8Consumption dominance curves were introduced in Makdissi and Wodon (2002).
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and
CDA:si (z) =

[
xi(z,q)
Xi(q)
− 1
]
f (z) for s = 1,
z∫
0
CDA:s−1i (y) dy for s ≥ 2.
(21)
By integration by parts, (20) and (21) can be written for s = 2, 3, ... as
CDR:si (z) =
1
(s− 2)!
z∫
0
[
xi (y, q)
Xi(q)
− y
µ
]
(z − y)s−2 dF (y) (22)
and
CDA:si (z) =
1
(s− 2)!
z∫
0
[
xi (y, q)
Xi(q)
− 1
]
(z − y)s−2 dF (y). (23)
This leads to our first main analytical result.
Theorem 1 A marginal decrease in the tax on good i is η-pro-poor (η ∈ {A,R})
for all indices P (z) ∈ Πs (z) and for all poverty lines z ∈ [0, z+] if and only if
CDη:si (z) ≥ 0, ∀z ∈
[
0, z+
]
. (24)
It is useful to interpret Theorem 1 in the context of the first two scenarios
listed at the beginning of Section 2.2 on page 6. For this, let us first classify goods
according to their income elasticity, εyi .
Definition 3 A good i is said to be an inferior good if εyi < 0 and a normal good
if εyi > 0, for all y.
Definition 4 A normal good is said to be a necessary good if εyi < 1 and a luxury
good if εyi > 1, for all y.
Four simple remarks can then be made as a corollary to Theorem 1.
Corollary 1 Regardless of the value of s and z+:
1. a reduction (an increase) in the tax of good i is never (always) A-pro-poor
if the good is a normal good;
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2. a reduction (an increase) in the tax of good i is always (never) A-pro-poor
if the good is an inferior good;
3. a reduction (an increase) in the tax of good i is never (always) R-pro-poor
if the good is a luxury good;
4. a reduction (an increase) in the tax of good i is always (never) R-pro-poor
if the good is a necessity.
The income elasticities εyi do not of course have to be uniformly negative,
positive, or below or above 1 for all values of y. When elasticities are not so
uniformly distributed, condition (24) will have to be checked on a case-by-case
distributional basis using Theorem 1.
2.6 Testing for pro-poorness of tax reforms
The above results are useful only in the cases in which only one tax or one
price is changed, if for instance the government does not necessarily want to keep
its overall revenue unchanged. For the case of a revenue-neutral tax reform sce-
nario, one must finance a marginal tax reduction for a good i by a marginal in-
crease in the tax on a good j in order to keep overall tax revenue constant. To
show how to do this, suppose that there are K consumption goods and denote by
R the per capita tax revenue of the overall indirect tax system:
R(q) =
K∑
k=1
tkXk(q). (25)
The impact of the marginal tax reform on per capita tax revenue is then given by
dR:
dR =
[
Xi(q) +
K∑
k=1
tk
∂Xk(q)
∂ti
]
dti +
[
Xj(q) +
K∑
k=1
tk
∂Xk(q)
∂tj
]
dtj. (26)
Revenue neutrality implies that dR = 0. Using (26), this leads to:
dtj = −γ
(
Xi(q)
Xj(q)
)
dti where γ =
1 + 1
Xi(q)
∑K
k=1 tk
∂Xk(q)
∂ti
1 + 1
Xj(q)
∑K
k=1 tk
∂Xk(q)
∂tj
. (27)
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Wildasin (1984) describes γ as the efficiency cost ratio of obtaining one dollar of
public funds by taxing good j to subsidize good i. We can now state our second
main result.
Theorem 2 A marginal tax reduction on good i financed by a marginal increase
in the tax on good j is η-pro-poor (η ∈ {A,R}) for all indices P (z) ∈ Πs (z) and
for all poverty lines z ∈ [0, z+] if and only if
CDη:si (z)− γCDη:sj (z) ≥ 0, ∀z ∈
[
0, z+
]
. (28)
The proof follows directly from that of Theorem 1.
2.7 Discussion
Yitzhaki and Thirsk (1990) and Yitzhaki and Slemrod (1991) find that if γ is
superior to one, it is impossible to secure a second-order welfare dominant tax
reform due to the efficiency loss incurred. From a poverty perspective, Makdissi
and Wodon (2002) note, however, that it is possible to have a reform that is domi-
nant at all orders of stochastic dominance even when γ is greater than one, so long
as that part of the burden is supported by the non poor.
This is also true here in the context of R and A pro-poorness. In (28), it is the
weighted difference between CDη:si (y) − γCDη:sj (y) that matters. A tax reform
can be economically inefficient (with γ > 1) and still be considered to be pro-poor
if CDη:sj (y) is not too large.
Theorems 1 and 2 can also be used to assess the impact of price changes and
tax reforms on absolute and relative inequality for any given order of dominance.
This is because of the specification of a and g chosen in this paper. In (8) for
relative pro-poorness, post-reform incomes are normalized by the ratio of aver-
age real incomes. This essentially serves to equalize average real incomes across
the pre- and the post-reform distributions. Using Duclos and Makdissi 2004, the
conditions (2) on the class of evaluation functions then make it possible to use
Theorems 1 and 2 to provide unambiguous conclusions on the impact of price
changes and tax reforms on relative inequality.
For absolute pro-poorness, (9) essentially centers real incomes around their
respective mean value. That makes it possible to use Theorems 1 and 2 to provide
unambiguous conclusions on the impact of price changes and tax reforms on ab-
solute inequality — that is, on inequality indices that aggregate distances between
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incomes and their mean value in a way that is consistent with the conditions de-
fined in (2).
When s = 1 and when γ = 1 (when there is no efficiency benefit or cost
to the tax reform), Theorem 2 says that a tax reform is absolutely pro-poor if
the poor’s share of the total consumption of good i exceeds their share of the total
consumption of good j. Exactly the same interpretation applies to the relative pro-
poorness of a tax reform when γ = 1: the poor’s share of the total consumption of
good i must exceed their share of the total consumption of good j. This is because
mean real income is unaffected by a revenue-neutral tax reform when γ = 1.9
When γ 6= 1, the interpretation of A and R pro-poorness differs. Take γ > 1,
a case in which average real income falls after the tax reform (because of the
efficiency cost). This is analogous to a case of negative growth. Relative pro-
poorness demands that the share of the poor in total real income does not fall
after the reform. Absolute pro-poorness demands that the absolute real income of
the poor does not fall after the reform by more than the absolute fall in total real
income. Since the initial share of the poor in total income is less than one (y/µ
is less than one in (22)), an economically inefficient reform will be more likely to
be absolutely pro-poor than relatively pro-poor.
The reverse reasoning applies to the case of an economically efficient tax re-
form, for which γ < 1 and average real income increases. Relative pro-poorness
demands that the share of the poor in total real income increases after the reform,
and absolute pro-poorness will require that the absolute real income of the poor
increases by more than total real income after the reform. Because of this, an
economically efficient reform will be more likely to be relatively pro-poor than
absolutely pro-poor.
If γ < 1, a reform will also be more likely to be considered relatively pro-
poor than absolutely pro-poor as s increases. The converse holds if γ > 1. This
is because the greater the value of s, the greater the importance given to the poor-
est of the poor in assessing pro-poorness conditions. (20) and (21) show that the
standard in assessing relative pro-poorness is the difference between shares in the
consumption of a good and shares in total income, but that the standard in assess-
ing absolute pro-poorness is the difference between shares in the consumption of
a good and 1. For the poor, that difference for relative pro-poorness will be larger
than for absolute pro-poorness. Since an increase in s increases the importance
given to the poorer individuals, ceteris paribus, an increase in s will also lead
more quickly to the validation of (28) for η = R than for η = A if γ < 1, and
9When γ = 1, we have g = a = 0 since Xjdtj +Xidti=0.
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more quickly to the validation of (28) for η = A than for η = R if γ > 1. If γ = 1
this difference vanishes as the conditions for relative or absolute pro-poorness of
tax reforms become both equivalent to the condition that a tax reform reduces
poverty (see Duclos, Makdissi, and Wodon 2008).
3 Estimation and inference
To be able to implement empirically the above tools, we ought to consider
the estimation and the sampling distribution of the curves needed to test for pro-
poorness. For this, we suppose for expositional simplicity that we dispose of a
sample of N independently and identically distributed observations,10 and that
the pre-reform income and consumption of goods j and l for observation i (i =
1, ..., N ) are denoted by yi, xij and x
i
l, respectively. Ignoring the constant
1
(s−2)! ,
the CDη:s curves can then be estimated for s ≥ 2 by the natural estimators
ĈD
R:s
k (z) =
1
N
N∑
i=1
xik (z − yi)s−2+
X̂k
−
1
N
N∑
i=1
yi (z − yi)s−2+
µ̂
(29)
and
ĈD
A:s
k (z) =
1
N
N∑
i=1
xik (z − yi)s−2+
X̂k
− 1
N
N∑
i=1
(z − yi)s−2+ , (30)
where f+ = max(0, f), X̂k = 1N
∑N
i=1 x
i
k is an estimator of average consumption
of good k, and µ̂ = 1
N
∑N
i=1 y
i is an estimator of average income.
The estimators ĈD
η:s
l (z)−γĈD
η:s
j (z) are given analogously. LetCD
s(xk; z) =∫ z
0
xk(y, q) (z − y)s−2 dF (y) and ĈD
s
(xk; z) =
1
N
N∑
i=1
xik (z − yi)s−2+ . The asymp-
totic sampling distribution of ĈD
s
(xk; z) for s ≥ 2 is given in Theorem 3.
Theorem 3 Let the second population moment of xk(y, θ) (z − y)s−2+ be finite.
Then, for s ≥ 2, N0.5
(
ĈD
s
(xk; z)− CDs(xk; z)
)
is asymptotically normal with
10The analytical results can be extended to account for complex multi-stage sampling designs.
Taking into sampling design is indeed done in the Mexican illustration below, using analytical
asymptotic methods along the lines of those described in Duclos and Araar (2006), Chapter 16.
More details can be obtained from the authors upon request.
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mean zero and with asymptotic variance given by:
lim
N→∞
N · var
(
ĈD
s
(xk; z)− CDs(xk; z)
)
= (s− 2)!−2
∫ (
xk(y)(z − y)s−2+
)2
dF (y)− CDs(xk; z)2. (31)
Prof: See the appendix.
The asymptotic distribution of ĈD
R:s
k (z) and ĈD
A:s
k (z) can be obtained by
noting that (29) and (30) are functions of ĈD
s
(xk; z), X̂k, ĈD
s
(y; z), µ̂, and
ĈD
s
(1; z). The sampling distribution ĈD
s
(y; z) and ĈD
s
(1; z) can be obtained
as special cases of Theorem 3. µ̂ and X̂k are simple sums of independently and
identically distributed random variables. Using the “delta method” of Rao (1973),
the sampling distribution of ĈD
A:s
k (z) and ĈD
R:s
k (z) can then be obtained by a
linear transformation of the covariance matrix of ĈD
s
(xk; z), X̂k, ĈD
s
(y; z), µ̂,
and ĈD
s
(1; z).
For s = 1, we need an estimator of xk (z, q), the expected consumption of
good k at z, times f(z). For this, we can use a non-parametric estimation proce-
dure, using for instance a kernel estimator defined such as
ĈD
1
(xk; z) =
1
N
N∑
i=1
κh (z − yi)xik, (32)
where h is a kernel bandwidth, κh (u) = h−1κ (u/h),
∫
κ(u)du = 1,
∫
uκ (u) du =
0 (for symmetry), and
∫
u2κ (u) du = cκ. In the illustration below, we choose a
Gaussian form for κ (u),
κ (u) =
e−0.5u
2
√
2pi
, (33)
but other kernel functional forms could also be used. In the illustration, we choose
h using the cross-validation method, which is asymptotically optimal (see Ha¨rdle
1990, Theorem 5.1.1) and we also a locally linear estimator to avoid biases at
the lower bound of expenditures. Theorem 4 then gives the asymptotic sampling
distribution of ĈD
1
(xk; z).
Theorem 4 Let i)
∫
κ (u)2 du exists, ii) h ∼ N−0.2, iii) CD1k (y) be twice differ-
entiable in y at y = z, iv) f(z) > 0, and v) ck(z) = xk(z)2 be continuous at z.
Then, (Nh)0.5
(
ĈD
1
(xk; z)− CD1(xk; z)− h2Bk(z)
)
is asymptotically normal
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with mean 0 and limiting variance Vk(z), whereBk(z) = 0.5 cκ∂2CD1(xk; z)/(∂z)2
and Vk(z) = f(z)ck(z)
∫
κ (u)2 du.
Prof: See the appendix.
The sampling distribution of ĈD
R:1
k (z) and ĈD
A:1
k (z) can then be obtained
by a linear transformation of the covariance matrix of ĈD
1
(xk; z), X̂k and µ̂
using the delta method. As for s ≥ 2, the terms needed to carry out statis-
tical inference are either constants (cκ and
∫
κ (u)2 du) or can be readily esti-
mated consistently in a distribution-free manner (this is the case, for instance,
of
∫ (
xk(z − y)s−2+
)2
dF (y), ĈD
s
(xk; z)
2, ∂2CD1(xk; z)/(∂z)2, f(z) and ck(z)).
Note, however, that it is usual to consider (and to find) the bias terms Bk(z) and
Bk(z)/Xk to be of negligible practical importance11, and we also make this as-
sumption in the illustration below.
4 An application to Mexico’s indirect tax system
4.1 Mexican data
We now briefly apply the above methodology to Mexico’s indirect tax system.
The data used for our application comes from the National Income and Expendi-
ture (ENIGH) Survey collected in 2004, which is nationally representative of the
Mexican population. ENIGH surveys collect information on incomes and expen-
ditures, goods and services used for self-consumption, as well as socio-economic
characteristics and labor market activities of all household members.
As is common in Latin America, we use total income per capita as the measure
of living standards for all members of a household. To correct for spatial variation
in prices, we assess all incomes in reference to rural prices and multiply urban
household incomes by the ratio of rural to urban poverty lines. We use as a guide
a 2004 rural poverty line set to 550 pesos per month per capita. To simplify the
interpretation of figures and the discussion, we normalize income by that rural
poverty line so that a household with an income equal to one is at the level of the
rural poverty line and a household with an income of 2 has a real income equal
to twice that line. We weight households by the product of household size and
11This is particularly true in the study of consumption data, where the second order derivative
of expected consumption at z, ∂2CD1(xk; z)/(∂z)2, may be expected to be small. For more on
this, see for instance Ha¨rdle (1990), p.101.
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household sampling weight; this is equivalent to formulating our estimators on
the basis of the population of individual living standards.
We consider indirect tax reforms affecting four broad classes of goods and
services (food, energy, transport and other goods) as well as various foodstuffs.12
Table 1 presents the percentage of total expenditure allocated to goods and ser-
vices by quintile. As expected, the share of total expenditures on food items
decreases from the poorest to the richest quintile. Conversely, the share of to-
tal expenditures on transportation and other goods increases with quintiles. Table
1 also shows that the composition of the food basket varies with income quintiles;
households in the poorest income quintile spend a greater share of their total food
expenditure on cereals (25.88%) and on vegetables (19.30%) than those in the
richest quintile — who spend relatively more (46.44%) on protein-intensive foods
(milk, meat and fish).
4.2 Impact of tax changes
Figure 1 presents relative dominance curves CDR:s(z) for three broad classes
of goods and services and for s = 1, 2, along with two-sided 90% confidence in-
tervals. Using the results of Theorem 1, this shows that a marginal tax reduction on
Food or on Energy would be relatively pro-poor, and that this conclusion would be
valid for any relative pro-poor judgements based on indices P ∈ Π1(z) (namely,
those that in agreement with the Pen principle) for a wide range of poverty lines
reaching almost 3. For s = 2, this is true for all possible poverty lines. Con-
versely, a marginal increase in the tax on any of these two classes of goods would
be considered relatively “anti-poor”. This suggests that it is important to consider
the use to which increases in tax revenues are put to know whether a tax reform is
globally pro-poor or not. We return to this below.
Figure 2 presents the corresponding absolute dominance curves CDA:s(z) for
three broad classes of goods and services. A marginal reduction in taxes on any
of the different goods could not be considered to be absolutely pro-poor. As in-
dicated in Corollary 1, this result is not surprising considering the fact that the
absolute pro-poor requirements are typically more demanding (since most goods
are normal goods) than the relative ones (since not all normal goods are luxury
goods) in the case of tax decreases. Conversely, increases in taxes on any of the
different goods will be absolutely pro-poor for all P ∈ Π1(z) for a large range of
12In 2004, all foodstuffs were exempt of value-added taxes (VAT) in Mexico. A few of these
goods were subsidized, however.
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poverty lines and for all P ∈ Π2(z) for all poverty lines.13
4.3 Impact of efficiency-neutral tax reforms
We now turn to the pro-poorness of revenue-neutral tax reforms. We first as-
sume that the tax reforms are efficiency neutral, viz, that γ = 1. Recall from page
15 that with γ = 1 the tests for absolute and relative pro-poorness are equivalent.
4.3.1 Efficiency-neutral reforms involving broad classes of goods
Figure 3 presents the difference between the absolute pro-poor consumption
dominance curves of Food and Transport, and this, for first and second orders of
dominance. Except for rather low poverty lines, the lower bound of the confidence
interval of this difference is always greater than zero, and hence a revenue-neutral
tax reform that decreases food taxes and increases transportation taxes would be
considered absolutely and relatively pro-poor for all P ∈ Π1(z) for a range of
poverty lines extending to about 3, and for all P ∈ Π2(z) for all poverty lines,
except again for a bottom range of relatively small poverty lines.
Figure 4 presents a similar difference, but this time between Food and Energy.
For s = 1, the lower bound of the confidence interval is greater than zero only up
to about the official poverty line. Given this degree of statistical insignificance, it
is therefore not immediate that one should consider as first-order pro-poor a rev-
enue and efficiency neutral tax reform that decreases food taxation and increases
energy taxation — or indeed the reverse. The concern is alleviated if we move to
s = 2: the lower bound of the confidence interval is greater than zero after around
z = 0.4 and up to almost 3.
Such tests of the effect of revenue and efficiency neutral tax reforms can be
performed on every pair of goods. Table 2 summarizes the test results for the pairs
of the three main goods. Here are some of the main findings.
• A tax reform that were to increase taxation on Transport and decrease tax-
ation on Food would be absolutely and relatively first-order pro-poor over a
13Theoretically speaking, the dominance tests carried out in Section 4 must be applied over
ranges varying between 0 and some z+. Statistically speaking, however, there is a general
“information-less” problem in the tails of distributions that impedes such testing for values of z
close to 0. Hence, statistically speaking, we must restrict the tests to a range that is lower-bounded
somewhere above 0. See Davidson and Duclos (2006) for a discussion of this.
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wide range of poverty lines (0.145-3 for the estimates, 0.190-2.971 for the
statistically significant range).14
• A tax reform that were to increase taxation on Transport and decrease tax-
ation on Energy would also be absolutely and relatively first-order pro-poor
over a wide range of poverty lines (0.137-3 for the estimates, 0.211-2.953
for the statistically significant range).
• Applying statistical inference techniques can alter conclusions substantially.
For instance, the estimates of Table 2 suggest that a tax reform that increases
taxes on Energy and that decreases taxes on Food is pro-poor over a wide
range of poverty lines (0.15 to 2.711). This is considerably shortened (0.206
to 0.925) when one focusses on the range over which the ranking of the
curves is statistically significant.
• If a reform is first-order pro-poor over a range of poverty lines that starts
at 0, then that range widens as we move to second-order pro-poorness —
see for instance the estimates shown in the first column, where the range of
poverty lines over which a rise in Food taxes combined to a fall in Energy
taxes is pro-poor increases from 0-0.15 to 0-0.31 as we move from first to
second-order dominance.
• This last result, however, is true only when the ranking is valid for a first-
order range of poverty lines that right at 0. Table 2 shows alternative in-
stances of interesting relationships between the ranges over which first-
order and second-order dominance hold. For instance, an increase in Energy
taxes and a fall in Food taxes (third column) is statistically first-order pro-
poor over a range 0.206-0.925 of poverty lines; that range becomes 0.383-
2.753 for second-order dominance. Increasing the order of dominance thus
reduces statistical significance over the lower values of poverty lines (the
lower bound increases from 0.206 to 0.383), but it increases considerably
(from 0.925 to 2.753) the upper bound of poverty lines over which the rank-
ing of the curves is statistically significant.
14Note that the poverty headcount at z = 0.145 is around 0.3%. Very little statistical informa-
tion is thus available below that value, an indication of the information-less problem mentioned in
footnote 13. It would also require a pro-poor judgement that would be almost strictly Rawlsian to
reverse the pro-poor judgements implied by the tests over 0.145-3 and 0.190-2.971.
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4.3.2 Efficiency-neutral reforms involving foodstuffs
Let us now turn to the pro-poorness of revenue and efficiency neutral tax re-
forms involving solely food items. Figure 5 shows for instance the difference
between the pro-poor consumption dominance curve of Cereals and that of Veg-
etables for first and second orders. The results are not statistically significant.
Moreover, and as discussed above, when a reform is not statistically pro-poor
within a range of poverty lines that starts at 0, the statistically insignificant range
can tend to widen as s is increased. This can be seen in Figure 5 by noting that
the area over which the confidence intervals overlap with the 0 line is pushed up
and is wider with second-order than with first-order dominance.
The pro-poorness results involving the pairs of the three main food items are
summarized in Table 3. They indicate that increasing Mexican taxes on Milk, meat
and fish to decrease taxes on Cereals and/or on Vegetables would be pro-poor, both
in terms of normative robustness and in terms of statistical significance, and this,
whether we consider first or second-order dominance. The results of Table 3 also
show that reforms involving any other combination of food items would not be so
robustly pro-poor.
4.4 Impact of efficiency non-neutral tax reforms
We have assumed until now that tax reforms would be efficiency neutral. This
assumes that the marginal deadweight loss of indirect taxation per dollar of tax
raised is the same across all commodities. This is unlikely to hold since it im-
plicitly assumes that compensated price elasticities are the same across all of the
goods involved in the reform.
To allow for efficiency non-neutral tax reforms, assume to start with that γ = 2
— that is, that tax reforms are inefficient to the extent that each per capita dollar
of tax raised on good j to finance a tax decrease on good i (see (28)) decreases per
capita welfare by 1 (namely, by γ-1) dollar. Figure 6 shows the difference between
the first-order absolute and relative pro-poor consumption dominance curves of
Food and of Energy, when the dominance curve for Energy is weighted by γ = 2.
Setting γ = 2 in that way implicitly supposes that the compensated price elasticity
for Food is lower than that for Energy, and that the marginal deadweight loss from
taxing Energy is thus greater than that from taxing Food.
Recall from Figure 4 that the difference between the first-order pro-poor con-
sumption dominance curves of Food and of Energy was statistically positive only
over a small range of poverty lines when γ was set to 1. With γ = 2, Figure 6
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shows that the difference in the absolute curves is now nowhere positive. It is even
in fact negative between around 0.7 and 2.2, which means that it would now be
relatively pro-poor over that range of poverty lines to decrease Energy taxes and
increase Food taxes.
The more inefficient it is to tax a good, the greater the tax rate that must be
levied on that good to generate the tax revenues needed to decrease taxes on an-
other, less price-elastic, good. If the more price-elastic good is not a luxury good,
this makes the poor lose proportionately more from an inefficient tax reform than
under an efficiency-neutral tax reform. This also makes increasing the price of
the more price-elastic good less likely to be relatively pro-poor. Only when the
price-elastic good is also a luxury good will an increase in its tax be conducive to
greater relative pro-poorness. Since Energy is not a luxury good in Mexico, the
greater the deadweight loss associated to taxing Energy, the more relatively pro-
poor it will be to tax Food instead. This is true even though, as shown on Figure
1, Food may be less income elastic than Energy in Mexico.
Figure 6 also shows that the difference in the absolute consumption dominance
curves is now everywhere positive, which also means that it is now absolutely pro-
poor to tax Energy to finance a tax decrease on Food. The reverse also holds: it
would absolutely anti-poor to finance a tax decrease on Energy by raising taxes
on Food. This is in sharp contrast to the above results for relative pro-poorness. If
the price elastic good is a normal good, the distance between the absolute loss of
the rich and that of the poor for γ > 1 will be even more considerable than with
an efficiency-neutral tax reform. Absolute pro-poorness of increasing taxes on the
more price-elastic good is then also more likely to hold in that context.
A similar exercise is repeated in Figure 7, which shows the difference between
the first-order relative and absolute pro-poor consumption dominance curve for
Cereals and that for Vegetables. The curve for Vegetables (presumably the more
price-elastic good) is being weighted by γ = 2. This can be compared to Figure
5 in which γ = 1. With γ = 2, it now possible to declare that a revenue-neutral
reform that increases taxes on Cereals and decreases them on Vegetables is first-
order relatively pro-poor. The reasoning is the same as before: Vegetables are not
a luxury good, and it is thus better not to raise taxes on that price-elastic good. But
a revenue-neutral reform that decreases taxes on Cereals and increases them on
Vegetables would be first-order absolutely pro-poor over a wide range of poverty
lines, again because, for γ > 1, that would maximize the distance between the
absolute loss of the rich and that of the poor.
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4.5 Trading off efficiency and distribution
The trade-off between efficiency (which is related to price elasticities) and the
shape of the CD curves (which is related to income elasticities) can be usefully
exemplified by the following ratio δη:si,j (z) of CD curves:
δη:si,j (z) =
CDη:si (z)
CDη:sj (z)
. (34)
Using (28) and supposing that CDη:sj (z) > 0, we then find that a revenue-neutral
tax reform that reduces taxation on good i and increases taxation on good j is
η-pro-poor (η ∈ {A,R}) if and only if
δη:si,j (z) ≥ γi,j ∀z ∈
[
0, z+
]
, (35)
where γi,j is the efficiency cost of taxing good j relative to good i. If CD
η:s
j (z) <
0, then the condition is rather that
δη:si,j (z) ≤ γi,j ∀z ∈
[
0, z+
]
. (36)
When CDη:sj (z) > 0, condition (35) shows that we can interpret δ
η:s
i,j (z) as
those critical efficiency ratios that must not be exceeded by γi,j for a tax reform
that reduces taxation on good i (and increases taxation on good j) to be declared
pro-poor. A reverse use of δη:si,j (z) can also be made: we can interpret δ
η:s
i,j (z) as
the critical efficiency ratios that must be surpassed by γi,j for a tax reform that
reduces taxation on good j (and increases taxation on good i) to be declared pro-
poor. When CDη:sj (z) < 0, condition (36) shows that we can interpret δ
η:s
i,j (z) as
critical efficiency ratios that must be exceeded by γi,j for a tax reform that reduces
taxation on good i (and increases taxation on good j) to be declared pro-poor.
Figure 8 shows the δη:s(z) curves for a reform involving Food and Energy.
Let us set an upper bound z+ = 2 to the range of poverty lines. Consider first
the absolute pro-poorness of a revenue-neutral reform that decreases taxation on
Food and increases taxation on Energy. Since CDA:sEnergy(z) < 0 (see Figure 2),
for such a reform to be absolutely pro-poor according to Figure 8, the efficiency
cost γi,j of taxing energy relative to food must be larger than 1.7. This statistic
is given by the maximal height of the upper bound of the confidence intervals
shown in Figure 8. At that maximal height, γi,j is indeed statistically greater than
δη:si,j (z), and condition (36) is therefore statistically verified. With γi,j larger than
1.7, the absolute fall in average real income will always be larger than the fall in
the poor’s real income, no matter what value of z below 2 is selected. This is
23
because a γi,j larger than 1.7 will always involve a sufficiently large increase in
the tax on Energy to compensate for the effect of the fall in Food taxation.
Consider then a revenue-neutral reform that increases taxation on food and
decreases taxation on energy, for the same upper bound of z+ = 2. For such a
reform to be absolutely pro-poor according to Figure 8, the efficiency cost γi,j of
taxing energy relative to food must be lower than 0.79. This statistic is now given
by the minimal height of the lower bound of the confidence intervals, for reasons
that are the reverse of those just mentioned.
A similar exercise can be carried out for relative pro-poorness, but with quite
different results. Since we now have that CDR:sEnergy(z) > 0 (see Figure 1), the
condition to check is (35). A revenue-neutral reform that decreases taxation on
Food and increases taxation on Energy will be relatively pro-poor according to
Figure 8 if the efficiency cost γi,j of taxing energy relative to food is lower than
around 0.5. Conversely, a revenue-neutral reform that increases taxation on Food
and decreases taxation on Energy will be relatively pro-poor if the efficiency cost
γi,j of taxing energy relative to food is greater than 4.5. When 0.5 ≤ γi,j ≤ 4.5,
the effect on relative pro-poorness of a tax reform involving Food and Energy is
either statistically insignificant or normatively sensitive to the choice of indices
and poverty lines between 0 and 2.
5 Conclusion
This paper develops a methodology for checking wether indirect tax reforms
can be considered to be pro-poor or not. The methodology extends previous
stochastic dominance techniques and enables one to characterize tax reforms on
the basis of wide spectra of possible views of “pro-poorness”. This is done for
both absolute and relative pro-poorness, for ranges of possible poverty lines, and
for different degrees of distributional sensitivity to the differentiated impact of tax
reforms across pre-reform values of welfare. Statistical inference techniques are
also provided to make these tools empirically applicable.
The methodology is applied to the pro-poorness of possible reforms of Mex-
ico’s indirect tax system, both across broad classes of goods and across foodstuffs.
This leads to the characterizations of a number of possible pro-poor indirect tax
reforms. The results also show that whether indirect tax reforms can be deemed to
be pro-poor can depend to an important extent on the type of distributional and/or
pro-poor views that are applied to the analysis, and that it is therefore important
to make such views clear when making policy recommendations for pro-poor tax
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reforms. The results further indicate that whether indirect tax reforms are pro-
poor depends 1) on whether government revenue neutrality is maintained, and 2)
on the size of the deadweight gains/losses incurred in the trade-off between bal-
ancing efficiency and redistribution.
6 Appendix
6.1 Proof of Theorem 1
First note that, substituting (20) in (18) and (21 in (19), we obtain
∂P ∗η (z)
∂ti
= −Xi(q)
∫ ∞
0
p(1) (y, z)CDη:1i (y)dy. (37)
The sufficiency condition for s = 1 is proved from (37) by noting that p(1) (y, z)
is negative. We then need to integrate by parts
∫∞
0
p(1) (y, z)CDη:1i (y)dy,∫ ∞
0
p(1) (y, z)CDη:1i (y)dy = p
(1) (y, z)CDη:2i (y)
∣∣∞
0
(38)
−
∫ ∞
0
p(2) (y, z)CDη:2i (y) dy.
We know that CDη:2i (0) = 0 and that p
1 (∞, z) = 0. The first term on the r.h.s.
of the above is thus nil. Consequently, equation (38) may be rewritten as∫ ∞
0
p(1) (y, z)CDη:1i (y)dy = −
∫ ∞
0
p(2) (y, z)CDη:2i (y) dy. (39)
Now, assume that we have:∫ ∞
0
p(1) (y, z)CDη:1i (y)dy = (−1)s−2
∫ ∞
0
p(s−1) (y, z)CDη:s−1i (y) dy. (40)
Integrating by parts equation (40), we get∫ ∞
0
p(1) (y, z)CDη:1i (y)dy = (−1)s−2 p(s−1) (y, z)CDη:s−1i (y)
∣∣∞
0
(41)
− (−1)s−2
∫ ∞
0
p(s) (y, z)CDη:si (y) dy.
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CDη:si (0) = 0 and p
(s−1) (∞, z) = 0 is implied by the definition of ∞ and by (2).
We can rewrite (41) as∫ ∞
0
p(1) (y, z)CDη:1i (y)dy = (−1)s−1
∫ ∞
0
p(s) (y, z)CDη:si (y) dy. (42)
Equation (39) obeys the relation depicted in (40). We have shown that if (40) is
true then equation (42) is also true. This implies that equation (42) is true for all
integer s ∈ {2, 3, ..., s− 1}. From equation (37) and (42), we get
∂P ∗η (z)
∂ti
= (−1)sXi(q)
∫ ∞
0
p(s) (y, z)CDη:si (y) dy. (43)
This last equation together with equation (2) proves the sufficiency of the condi-
tion.
In order to establish necessity, consider the set of functions p (y, z) for which
the (s− 1)th derivative (with p(0) (y, z) = p (y, z)) is of the following form
p(s−1) (y, z) =

(−1)s−1 ² y ≤ y
(−1)s−1 (y + ²− y) y < y ≤ y + ²
0 y > y + ².
(44)
Poverty indices whose function p (y, z) has the particular above form for p(s−1) (y, z)
belong to Πs. This yields:
p(s) (y, z) =

0 y < y
(−1)s y < y < y + ²
0 y > y + ².
(45)
Imagine now that CDη:si (y) < 0 on an interval [y, y + ²] for y < z
+ and for ²
that can be arbitrarily close to 0. For p (y, z) defined as in (44), expression (43) is
then positive and the marginal tax reform induces a marginal increase of poverty.
Hence, it cannot be that CDη:si (y) < 0 for y ∈ [y, y + ²] when y < z+. This
proves the necessity of the condition.
6.2 Proof of Theorem 3
ĈD
s
(xk; z) is a consistent estimator of CDs(xk; z) by the existence of the first
population moment of xk(y) (z − y)s−2+ and the law of large numbers. ĈD
s
(xk; z)
is N0.5 consistent and asymptotically normal by the existence of the second pop-
ulation moment and the central limit theorem, with asymptotic variance given by
31 by simple calculation.
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6.3 Proof of Theorem 4
Note first that E
[
ĈD
1
(xk; z)
]
=
∫
κh (z − y) xk(y)f(y)dy. Denoting t =
h−1(z − y) and expanding around t0 = 0, for small h this is approximately equal
to
E
[
ĈD
1
(xk; z)
]
(46)
'
∫
κ (t)
[
CD1(xk; z)− thCD1′(xk; z) (z) + 0.5t2h2ĈD
1′′(xk; z) (z)
]
dt
= +0.5h2ĈD
1′′(xk; z) (z) cκ (47)
since
∫
κ (u) du = 1,
∫
uκ (u) du = 0, and
∫
u2κ (u) du = cκ. Hence, the bias
E
[
ĈD
1
(xk; z)
]
− CD1(xk; z) is given by 0.5h2ĈD
1′′(xk; z)cκ.
By (32), note that ĈD
1
(xk; z) is a sum of iid variables to which we may apply
the central limit theorem and show asymptotic normality. We also have that
N var
(
ĈD
1
(xk; z)
)
= var (κh (z − y)xk(y)) = E
[
κh (z − y)2 (xk(y))2
]− E [ĈD1(xk; z)]2
=
∫
y
κh (z − y)2 (xk(y))2 dF (y)− E
[
ĈD
1
(xk; z)
]2
=
∫
u
h−2κ (u)2 (xk(z − uh))2 dF (z − uh)− E
[
ĈD
1
(xk; z)
]2
, (48)
where the last expression is obtained by substituting u for h−1(z − y). For small
h, (48) is approximately equal to
Nvar
(
ĈD
1
(xk; z)
)
∼=
∫
u
h−1κ (u)2 (xk(z))
2 f(z)du− E
[
ĈD
1
(xk; z)
]2
= h−1f(z) (xk(z))
2
∫
u
κ (u)2 du− E
[
ĈD
1
(xk; z)
]2
(49)
∼= h−1f(z) (xk(z))2
∫
u
κ (u)2 du (50)
= h−1f(z)ck(z)
∫
κ (u)2 du. (51)
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Hence,
lim
N→∞
Nhvar
(
ĈD
1
(xk; z)− CD1(xk; z)− h2Bk
)
= f(z)ck(z)
∫
κ (u)2 du = Vk(z),
which concludes the proof.
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Table 1: Shares (by population quintiles) of total expenditures on different goods
and services
Expenditure shares in %
Quintile Poorest 2 3 4 Richest
Goods and services
Food 42.99 28.88 22.61 17.20 8.04
Energy 6.13 5.09 4.45 3.87 2.64
Transport 11.74 11.90 12.09 13.32 12.42
Other goods 39.14 54.13 60.85 65.61 76.9
Shares of food expenditures
Cereals 25.88 23.91 21.20 18.95 15.90
Milk, meat and fish 28.66 37.92 41.90 45.61 46.44
Vegetables 19.30 18.30 17.63 17.86 17.66
Other food items 26.16 19.87 19.27 17.58 20.00
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Table 2: Intervals of poverty lines over which a revenue and efficiency neutral
tax reform that decreases taxes on row goods and that increases taxes on column
goods can be considered pro-poor (absolutely and relatively speaking)
First-order dominance
Goods Food Transport Energy
Food — 0.145-3.000+ 0.150-2.711
— (0.190-2.971) (0.206-0.925)
Transport 0.000-0.145 — 0.000-0.137
— —
Energy 0.000-0.150 0.137-3.000+ —
(0.211-2.953) —
Second-order dominance
Goods Food Transport Energy
Food — 0.279-3.000+ 0.310-3.000+
— (0.375-3.000+) (0.383-2.753)
Transport 0.000-0.279 – 0.000-0.269
— — —
Energy 0.000-0.310 0.269-3.000+ —
— (0.458-3.000+) —
Note: The intervals that appear on the first line of each cell are estimates. The intervals over which
the results are statistically significant at a 95% level are shown within parentheses on the second
line of each cell.
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Table 3: Intervals of poverty lines over which a revenue and efficiency neutral
tax reform that decreases taxes on row goods and that increases taxes on column
goods can be considered pro-poor
First-order dominance (s = 1)
Goods Cereals Milk, Meat and Fish Vegetables
Cereals — 0.000-2.231 0.000-0.171
— (0.010-2.159) (0.000-0.107)
Milk, Meat and Fish 2.231-3.000+ — 0.010-0.012
(2.294-3.000+) — —
Vegetables 0.171-0.588 0.012-2.421 —
( 0.271-0.458) ( 0.044-2.040) —
Second-order dominance (s = 2)
Goods Cereals Milk, Meat and Fish Vegetables
Cereals — 0.000-3.000+ 0.000-0.328
— (0.219-3.000+) —
Milk, Meat and Fish — — 0.067-0.112
— — —
Vegetables 0.328-0.701 0.067-3.000+ —
— (0.196-3.000+) —
Note: The intervals that appear on the first line of each cell are estimates. The intervals over which
the results are statistically significant at a 95% level are shown within parentheses on the second
line of each cell.
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Figure 1: 90 % two-sided confidence intervals around relative pro-poor consumption
dominance curves, CDR:s(z)
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Figure 2: 90 % two-sided confidence intervals around absolute pro-poor consumption
dominance curves, CDA:s(z)
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Figure 3: Difference between absolute pro-poor consumption dominance curves
CDA:s=1Food (z)− CDA:s=1Transport(z)
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Figure 4: Difference between absolute pro-poor consumption dominance curves
CDA:s=1Food (z)− CDA:s=1Energy(z)
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Figure 5: Difference between pro-poor consumption dominance curves
CDA:s=1Cereals(z)− CDA:s=1V egetables(z)
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Figure 6: Difference between pro-poor consumption dominance curves, assuming that
the deadweight loss from taxing Energy is twice as large as that from taxing Food
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Figure 7: Difference between pro-poor consumption dominance curves, assuming that
the deadweight loss from taxing Vegetables is twice as large as that from taxing Cereals
CDR:s=1Cereals(z)− 2CDR:s=1V egetables(z)
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Figure 8: The ratio between pro-poor consumption dominance curves
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